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4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (j), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
appeal is taken from an Order of the Utah Labor Commission denying Ameritech's
ability to apportion medical expenses in this occupational disease claim, which was then
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.) The primary issue for review is whether the Labor Commission correctly
applied the law in the instant case. Under the Occupational Disease Act, an employer can
only be found liable for their portion of the disease that was caused by their work. The
Commission should have applied this principle to Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits as the
ALJ did in the instant case. The Commission failed to apply the Occupational Disease
Act to the facts of the instant case and Ameritech has been prejudiced by said decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Commission's application of a statute will be
reviewed for correctness with no deference to the administrative agency.

Drake v.

Industrial Comm'n., 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL: This matter was heard by the Honorable
Deidre Marlowe on October 7, 2003. On June 23, 2004, Judge Marlowe issued her
Findings of Fact & Interim Order. (Appellate Index Number (hereinafter referred to as
C

R.') 133-142).

Judge Marlowe referred this matter to a medical panel for a

determination on Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome and whether it was work related.
The medical panel report was issued on September 17, 2004. (R. 143-145).
5

The ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on June 28,
2005, limiting Ms. Edmonds' recovery in this case. (R. 168-178). Based upon the
medical panel report, the ALJ concluded that only 10% of Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel
syndrome had been caused by her work activities and, therefore, Ms. Edmonds' medical
expenses related to her carpal tunnel syndrome should be apportioned under the
Occupational Disease Act. The ALJ determined that Ameritech only was responsible for
10% of Ms. Edmonds' future medical expenses and past medical expenses related to her
carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. 168-178).
Ms. Edmonds filed her motion for review challenging the apportionment of
medical expenses. (R. 179-188). The Labor Commission granted the motion for review
providing that medical expenses could not be apportioned on August 29, 2006. (R. 206211). Ameritech filed the instant appeal as a result thereof and seeking to overturn the
Labor Commission's decision on review on September 28, 2006.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Ms. Edmonds filed an Application for Hearing requesting
Medical Expenses, Recommended Medical Care, Temporary Total Compensation,
Permanent Partial Compensation, and Interest.

(R. 2-90).

Ms. Edmonds filed her

occupational disease claim as a result of repetitive trauma to her hands and arms from
excessive keyboard use and other job activities. (R. 2).
Course of Proceedings: Ms. Edmonds filed her Application for Hearing on or
about September 3, 2002. (R. 2-90). She sought benefits for her alleged carpal tunnel
syndrome, from which she allegedly suffered as a result of her employment activities.
6

This matter was adjudicated and referred to a medical panel by the ALJ. (R. 133-142).
The medical panel issued a decision with mixed results to both of the parties to this
litigation. (R. 143-145). As a result, both Ms. Edmonds and Ameritech filed objections
to the medical panel challenging the results thereof. (R. 146-155).
The ALJ considered the arguments objecting to the medical panel, but disregarded
those arguments and entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on or
about June 28, 2005. (R. 167-178). Ms. Edmonds filed her motion for review on or
about July 28, 2005, challenging the ALJ's apportionment of medical expenses in this
case. (R. 179-188). Ameritech filed a memorandum opposing the motion for review and
requesting the Labor Commission uphold and affirm the ALJ decision apportioning
medical expenses in an occupational disease claim. (R. 190-205).
The Labor Commission issued its Order on Motion for Review on August 29,
2006, reversing the ALJ decision to apportion medical expenses.

(R. 206-211).

Ameritech filed its notice of appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals on or about
September 28, 2006.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case involves an occupational disease claim by Ms. Edmonds while working
for Ameritech. (R. 169).

2.

Ms. Edmonds first filed an Application for Hearing wherein she claimed she was
injured on or around January 1994, due to continual computer and phone work.
(R. 170).
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3.

On November 4, 2002 (received on December 23, 2002), Ms. Edmonds filed an
Amended Application for Hearing, which claimed an Occupational Disease injury
between 1991 and July 1999. (R. 103-106).

4.

Ms. Edmonds stated she had developed carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), and the
injury was due to repetitive trauma to hands, arms, from excessive use of
computer keyboard and other job activities. (R. 103-106).

5.

Ms. Edmonds claimed the injury caused her to miss work at various times. (R.
103-106).

6.

She also added a claim for permanent partial disability compensation, and the need
for surgery. (R. 103-106).

7.

This matter was heard by the Honorable Deidre Marlowe on October 7, 2003. (R.
168).

8.

Ms. Edmonds testified regarding her employment at Ameritech began in October
1991. (R. 169).

9.

Her duties consisted of scheduling and completing purchase orders for all
equipment, as well as data entry, install hardware components, and perform any
other tasks that needed to be done. (R. 170).

10.

Ms. Edmonds alleges the first time she noticed her symptoms of pain in the wrists
was said to be in 1992. (R. 170).

11.

According to Ms. Edmonds the pain would come and go until the fall of 1993, but
still did not seek treatment until January 14, 1994. (R. 170).
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12.

She testified that during her two pregnancies while working at Ameritech the
symptoms lessened even though she was working while on bed rest during the
second pregnancy. (R. 170).

13.

In 1999, Ms. Edwards testified that she was doing all sales in addition to her inside
duties. (R. 172).

14.

Her symptoms continued despite the fact she quit her job at Ameritech. (R. 172).

15.

The ALJ found Ms. Edmonds did not lose any time off work due to any injuries
(R. 178), and injuries to the upper extremities were not related to the claim. (R.
174).

16.

The ALJ found that based upon the medical panel Ms. Edmonds' employment was
not the sole cause of the symptoms, and 90% of the symptoms were caused by
non-industrial risk factors and only 10% of the symptoms were aggravated by the
job. (R. 174).

17.

The ALJ adopted the medical panel opinion and provided that Ms. Edmonds was
only entitled to 10% of future medical benefits as Ameritech had been found to be
responsible for only 10% of Ms. Edmonds' physical symptoms. (R. 175).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Legislature specifically allows for apportionment of medical expenses when it

passed §34A-3-105.

Under the plain language of the statute, if a worker has an

occupational disease that is spread across two different employers, the employers pay
medical expenses according to their percentage of fault. Given the fact occupational

9

exposures are usually a disease or prolonged exposure with multiple sources this is sound
policy to allow employers to offset the burden of non-industrial factors.
This Court should allow apportionment as the Legislature specifically enacted
§105 with the intent of allowing the apportionment of medical expenses. Ostensibly, the
same holds true for § 110.
Commission's

Consequently, this Court should overrule the Labor

decision disallowing apportionment of medical expenses in an

occupational disease claim.

The Utah Occupational Disease Act allows for

apportionment of medical expenses and the decision of the Labor Commission to the
contrary should be reversed.
Finally, public policy should allow an employer to apportion its liability based
upon the percentage it contributed to the occupational disease based upon the mandate
that employers should not be held to be the general insurer of its employee population.
ARGUMENTS
L

THE LABOR COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND APPORTIONED MS.
EDMONDS5 MEDICAL EXPENSES PURSUANT TO THE
PERCENTAGE OF LIABILITY FOUND BY THE ALJ AND THE
MEDICAL PANEL

Ameritech requests this Court overturn the Labor Commission ruling disallowing
the apportionment of medical expenses in occupational disease claims as the plain
language of the Occupational Disease Act allows for apportionment. Specifically, the
Workers Compensation Act has defined "compensation" to mean "the payments and
benefits provided for in [Chapter 2] or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act." Utah
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Code Ann. § 34A-2-102(3). Payments and benefits would include medical benefits for
the Petitioner's industrial injury or exposure.
Apportionment of medical expenses already has been the subject of the will of the
Utah Legislature, which has determined that apportionment of medical expenses is
proper. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105, provides in pertinent part that:
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational
disease which arises out of and in the course of the employee's employment for
more than one employer, the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the
disease if
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with that
employer was a substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational
disease; and
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12 months.
(2) Should the conditions of Subsections (1) not be met, liability for disability,
death, and medical benefits shall be apportioned between employers based on the
involved employers' causal contribution to the occupational disease.
The Legislature has already determined that apportionment between employers is
proper due to the fact the Legislature apparently believes an employer should only be
responsible for their portion of an injury caused by an occupational exposure. This
directly refutes the Labor Commission's statement that apportionment of medical
expenses would be impossible to apply to the medical expenses of an injured worker.
This is not the case. It simply is a matter of obtaining the overall amount of medical
expenses the worker incurred as result of their injury and paying the percentage amount
of the overall total.
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The Legislature had this in mind when it passed § 34A-3-105 under the plain
language of the statute. If a worker has an occupational disease that is spread across two
different employers, the employee would submit medical expenses to each employer.
The employer would then issue a check for their percentage of liability on the worker's
medical expenses related to the occupational exposure. Given the fact occupational
exposures are usually a disease or prolonged exposure with multiple sources this is sound
policy to allow employers to offset the burden of non-industrial factors.
A.

CHAPTER THREE OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS
CONSISTENT WITH CHAPTER TWO IN TERMS OF AN
EMPLOYER BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR ONLY THEIR SHARE
OF THE INDUSTRIALLY CAUSED INJURY

Proportion of liability as presented in Chapter 3 of the Workers Compensation Act
is entirely consistent with Chapter 2 and the limits on an employer's liability contained
therein. Specifically, Chapter 2 provides the employer shall not pay permanent partial
disability benefits for "any permanent impairment that existed prior to an industrial
accident." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-412(c)(2). The ostensible reasoning behind this
section is the employee should not receive workers compensation coverage for nonindustrial impairments or for pre-existing conditions. In fact, the Labor Commission has
consistently ruled that an employer should only pay medical expenses for those industrial
injuries that occur within the course and scope of employment and are medically caused
by the industrial conditions with respect to the particular employer.

See, Allen v.

Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In cases where an employee has an
underlying medical condition that is not industrially related, the employer need only pay
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medical benefits for the industrially related medical benefits. Otherwise, the employer
would become the general insurer of the working population, which is what these rules
are tailored to prevent.
An employer need only pay medical benefits for the industrial injury that occurred
within the course and scope of employment and is medically caused by the employment
duties. An example would be an employee who experiences headaches and then has a
neck injury. While the neck injury may be covered and medical benefits paid for said
neck injury, the employer need not pay medical benefits for the underlying, pre-existing
headaches, which is proportion of liability in the industrial accident arena.
The same can be said for the Utah Occupational Disease Act, except to the extent
that instead of having underlying, non-industrial injuries affecting other portions of the
body that have experienced an industrial injury, there would be underlying, non-industrial
injuries to the body part alleged to be experiencing the occupational disease. In this case,
the medical panel and the ALJ determined the Petitioner only had 10% industrially
related symptoms with respect to her carpal tunnel syndrome.

Consequently, the

Petitioner had 90% non-industrial contribution to the particular body part.
According to proportion of liability, therefore, the employer only should be liable
for the proportion of the exposure that occurred within the course and scope of
employment and was medically caused by industrial factors.

Otherwise, even if the

employer contributed only 1% to the employee's condition the employer would be liable
for 100% of the medical expenses. This essentially would make the employer the general
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insurer of employees with massive health issues, but who managed to show a 1%
contribution to the underlying health problems.
In Chapter 2 of the Workers Compensation Act, an industrial accident is
apportioned between industrial and non-industrial factors and the employer only is liable
for the industrially caused injuries, not pre-existing injuries or non-industrial injuries.
Another example being a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing condition; wherein the
employer only is liable for the period of temporary aggravation, not all future medical
expenses for the pre-existing condition. Accordingly, the employer only is liable for its
proportion of the industrially related injury.
As stated in § 34A-3-105, an employee's employment duties must be a substantial
contributing factor to the employee's occupational disease before an employer may be
held liable for the entirety of the occupational disease and medical benefits associated
therewith. In this case, Ms. Edmonds' employment related portion of her carpal tunnel
syndrome only was 10%; which the ALJ found to be not a substantial contributing factor.
The ALJ acted pursuant to statute and correctly held that Ameritech was only
responsible for the 10% amount with respect to Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits. This
apportionment would be no different than under Chapter 2 of the Act when dealing with
non-industrial factors or pre-existing conditions. Consequently, Ameritech requests this
Court reverse the Labor Commission and apportion its liability to 10% of the medical
expenses.
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II.

THE LABOR COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF THE UTAH
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND DOES NOT TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THE PASSAGE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE ACT SUPERSEDED PRIOR CASE LAW

The Labor Commission disallowed apportionment of medical benefits based upon
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979). The Labor
Commission erroneously determined that based upon said case, medical expenses are
separate and apart from regular compensation and, therefore, Ameritech could not
apportion the medical expenses.

(R. 209).

Ameritech believes this is in direct

contradiction of the plain language provided in the Utah Occupational Disease Act,
§34A-3-110.
The case law cited by the Labor Commission was based upon law prior to the
enactment of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. Specifically, the Occupational Disease
Act was passed in 1991 (originally enacted as 35-2-101, et seq.).

The Occupational

Disease Act allows for the apportionment of medical expenses under the plain language
of its text and as contemplated by the Utah Legislature in § 34A-3-105. To allow
apportionment of medical expenses under §105 and disallow apportionment under §110
would be inconsistent with the remainder of the statute.

If the Legislature allows

apportionment of medical expenses in §105, it stands to follow that it allowed for
apportionment of medical expenses in §110.
Despite considering the previous statutory language, the Labor Commission
disallowed apportionment under Kennecott.

Although not cited by the Labor

Commission, Kennecott had been upheld in 1982 when the Utah Supreme Court issued
15

its decision in Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). The
Court segmented compensation away from medical expenses and held that for purposes
of the statute of limitations, compensation did not mean medical expenses. Id. at 756.
Its basis for upholding Kennecott was the rule of statutory interpretation by the
Court. The Court upheld the distinction between 'compensation' and 'medical expenses'
because the Legislature had amended the statute of limitations section (§35-1-99) without
changing the language that had been construed by the courts.

Id. at 756-757.

Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court provided the following:
A well established canon of statutory construction provides that where a
legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, or
reenacts them without change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied
with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to
have adopted them as consistent with its own intent. {Id. at 756 (citations
omitted)).
Not only was the Court in Christensen and Kennecott dealing with compensation
as opposed to medical expenses for purposes of applying the statute of limitations to a
claim, but also the Court provided the basis for reversal in the instant case. If the
Legislature enacted the Utah Occupational Disease Act in 1991, after the rulings in
Christensen and Kennecott, and allowed for the apportionment of medical expenses in
cases of occupational exposure, then the Legislature has superseded the analysis in the
prior two cases.
The Legislature specifically enacted §105 with the intent of allowing the
apportionment of medical expenses.

Ostensibly, the same holds true for § 110.

Consequently, the analysis in prior cases with respect to the difference between medical
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expenses and compensation disappears and this Court should overrule the Labor
Commission's decision disallowing apportionment of medical expenses in an
occupational disease claim.

The Utah Occupational Disease Act allows for

apportionment of medical expenses and the decision of the Labor Commission to the
contrary should be reversed.
III.

IT IS SOUND PUBLIC POLICY TO ALLOW APPORTIONMENT
OF MEDICAL EXPENSES IN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES
LEST THE EMPLOYER BECOME THE GENERAL INSURERS OF
ITS EMPLOYEES

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently presented two mandates when dealing
with the Utah Labor Commission and cases involving injured workers. First, the Court
has determined that an employer should not be held to be the general insurer of its
employees when there are non-industrial or pre-existing conditions involved with an
industrial injury or exposure. Allen, 729 P.2d at 23. The second mandate is to rule in
favor of coverage when the issue of compensability is a close call. Nyrehn v. Industrial
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Furthermore, to facilitate the
purposes of the legislation, the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed
and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the applicant.") (quotations
omitted).
These two competing mandates are at work in the instant case, and although
Ameritech recognizes that coverage should flow when the law allows and it is a close
contest, in the instant case Ameritech should not be held to be the general insurer of Ms.
Edmonds' carpal tunnel problems. It is unsound policy to make an employer pay when
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the employer is not the substantial cause of the occupational disease. Otherwise, an
employee with massive pre-existing and non-industrial exposures would be able to have
their problems covered under the Workers Compensation Act if they could prove their
employment caused even 1% of worker's condition and thereby making their employer
their general insurer.
This scenario is at hand in the instant case where 90% of Ms. Edmonds' problems
stem from non-industrial factors. Despite this proven fact, the Labor Commission would
have Ameritech pay for 100% of Ms. Edmonds medical expenses. Although Ameritech
recognizes the laws should be liberally construed in favor of coverage when there is a
close question of law or fact; it is undisputed that Ameritech did not cause the majority of
Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel problems. As such, it would be sound policy, as found by
the Legislature in § 34A-3-105, to be able to apportion medical expenses based upon
percentage of liability for the occupational disease.
Otherwise, the Labor Commission is allowed to take the mandate for coverage in
close calls and use it as a cudgel to force a party that did not substantially contribute to an
occupational disease to pay 100% of the medical expenses for the disease. Public policy
should allow an employer to apportion its liability based upon the percentage it
contributed to the occupational disease.

As a result, this Court should allow the

apportionment of medical expenses for public policy reasons and in keeping with its first
mandate of not allowing employers to be the general insurers of its employee population.

18

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritech respectfully request this Court overturn the
Labor Commission Order On Motion for Review and allow Ameritech to apportion its
liability for Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses based upon its percentage of liability.
DATED THIS ^ 7

day of January, 2007.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

A.^

o.(7.a.£D

iOD
)D0RE E. KANELL
rOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Ameritech
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an
addendum in included herewith.
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RECEIVED •
JUN YQ 2005
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

PLAN/CHRSSTEMSEM
& KANELL

TAMARA EDMUNDS,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

v.

Case No.: 2002969

AMERITECH LIBRARY SERVICES, fka
DYNTX, aka EPLXTECH; AMERICAN
PROTECTION SERVICES;
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY/KEMPER,

Judge: DEJDRE MARLOWE

Respondents.

Hearing:
October 7, 2003
Appearances:
Phillip Shell for the Petitioner
Theodore Kanell for Ameritech Library Services and American Protection
Services (American Mfg. Mutual/Kemper)
Thomas Sturdy for Dynix and Continental Casualty
Brett Hanna for Epixtech
Lorrie Lima for the Uninsured Employers' Fund
On September 3, 2002 Tamara Edmunds filed an application for benefits claiming
medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation, and travel
expenses. On December 23, 2003 Ms. Edmunds filed an amended claim to include permanent
partial compensation in addition to the benefits claimed on the initial application. The
Uninsured Employers' Fund was dismissed as it was determined that insurance coverage existed
between January 1, 1995 and January 1, 1996.
Findings of Fact and Interim Order was issued on June 23, 2004 referring the medical
aspects of this case to a Commission medical panel for evaluation. The panel issued its report on
September 9, 2004 and it was mailed to the parties via certified mail on September 17, 2004.
Attorneys Kanell and Hanna filed timely objections to the medical panel report's entry into the
record.

OBJECTIONS TO THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT
Utah Code § 34A-2-601 contains the procedures for Labor Commission medical panels.
Section 34A-2-601(2)(d)(i) requires the ALJ to "...promptly distribute full copies of the report...by
certified mail...". Section 34A-2-601(2)(ii) and (iii) outline the objection process and state:
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited
in the United States post office, the following may file with the administrative law
judge written objections to the report: (A) the applicant; (B) the employer; or
(C) the employer's insurance carrier.
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the period described in Subsection
(2)(d)(ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence.
It is clear from the above statute that the parties have 15 days to file an objection to the
report's entry into the evidentiary record of the proceedings, as failure to file an objection results
in the report's entry into the record. At that point, the preponderance of medical evidence must
still be considered in reaching the final determination.
The respondents object to the panel's answer to question 9, where the panel recommends
the petitioner receive additional medical treatment, including surgery for her carpal tunnel
symptoms. The question erroneously asks for treatment related to her "industrial injury" rather
than "occupational disease." However, the panel's treatment recommendation is related to the
petitioner's condition generally and makes no statements that this is solely industrially caused.
The panel clearly apportions between industrial and non-industrial causes earlier in its report and
the recommendation for treatment must be read in light of the panel's prior apportionment
opinion. There is no need for further clarification from the panel, thus the report is admitted into
the evidentiary record pursuant to Utah Code § 34A-2-601.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Tamara Edmunds (hereinafter "Petitioner") starting working for Dynix in October 1991.
Her employer in this matter has had a few name changes over the years but the business
has remained substantially the same. In about 1997 the name was changed from Dynix to
Ameritech Library Services, and then about 2000 the name was changed to Epixtech,
which it remains currently. For purposes of this order, I will refer to the Respondent
employer as "Epixtech."

2.

For workers' compensation coverage, Epixtech was insured by Continental Casualty from
January 1, 1989 through December 31, 1994, and by American Manufacturing
Mutual/Kemper from January 1, 1995 through January 1, 2000. Medical expenses have
been covered by Continental Casualty up until sometime in the year 2000.

3.

Petitioner was married at all times relevant to this claim.

4.

Epixtech works with school libraries to install and maintain library automation systems.
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The Petitioner was the Project Coordinator/Administrative Assistant. She worked 8-10
hours a day, and sometimes up to 14 hours a day during busy times. The busy times
would normally be over the Thanksgiving weekend, from Christmas to New Year's (first
week of January), and the spring and summer school breaks, when the bulk of work
would come in. In an 8 hour day the Petitioner would spend 7 - TA hours typing with
both hands and on the telephone. The rest of the day she spent going back and forth
between different work stations in her area. On fourteen hour days, she spent about 12 13 hours typing and on the telephone, and about 1 - 154 hours going between the different
work stations in her work area. The Petitioner's duties were scheduling and completing
purchase orders for all the equipment. Because she was the project coordinator she also
had to do data entry, install hardware components, and perform any other tasks needed to
get a project done.
5.

The Petitioner began to notice symptoms with her hands mid 1992. This was a busy
summer and Petitioner was in charge of about 60 schools. The Petitioner experienced
pain in her wrists and tingling and numbness in the middle two fingers, and occasionally
her pinky fingers. When the symptoms were at their worst they were felt in her whole
hand. There was also a situation when Epixtech had a shortage of office space and
employees would stack tables on top of one another, then the systems would be placed on
the floor, in the middle, and on the top desk, and Petitioner would work at these different
levels, climbing up or sitting on the floor as needed.

6.

The Petitioner testified that the pain came and went until it came to stay in the fall of
1993. She first went to see a doctor on January 14, 1994. ME p. 1. Alexander Theodore,
M.D. submitted a first report of injury. ME p. 153. The Petitioner was experiencing
pain and numbness in her hands and wrists, and tightness in the forearms and up. Initially
it was treated with medication and therapy, including splints, and hot and cold water
treatment, with some improvements. ME p. 157. At home, the symptoms would stay
pretty much the same; the Petitioner slept with braces at nighttime and took pain
medication which helped her sleep. ME p. 157. On Aug 4, 1994 the notes on ME p.
158 reflect overuse syndrome; the Petitioner indicates her workload increased, resulting
in increased symptoms. On an August 26, 1994 visit, ME p. 159, the condition again
improved with wearing splints. The Petitioner still felt symptoms while wearing the
splints, which were aggravated when she worked.

7.

In 1995 or 1996 the Petitioner became an Inside Sales Representative. Her title changed,
but most of her duties remained the same as described in paragraph 4 above - she was still
doing ordering and constant phone work. Most of this was desk work, but she did have
to travel about once a year covering for some of the outside sales representatives. When
traveling the Petitioner had to carry equipment which was large and bulky at that time and
this was hard on her hands.
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8.

The employer moved to a new building in 1994. Treatments received in 1994 lessened
the pain but it never went away completely. The symptoms changed depending on the
time of year and how busy the workload was, they were aggravated during the busy times.

9.

By March of 1995 the symptoms were intermittent; there was numbness in the left hand,
not constant but still appearing. The Petitioner returned for treatment for carpal tunnel
syndrome in November 1995 (ME p. 160) and was sent to physical therapy, ME p. 196.
The notes indicate an onset of symptoms in shoulder, neck and upper back in the previous
two or three weeks. The Petitioner explained that they lost a sales rep at work and she
had to pick up 1he slack, resulting in more work for her.

10.

The Petitioner's symptoms were somewhat lessened during her pregnancies. Her first
child was born March 31, 1993. The second child was bom May 15,1996. The
Petitioner was ordered to bed the last six weeks of this pregnancy, and computers,
printers, a phone, and a fax machine were installed in her bedroom so she could continue
to work. She put in more time than usual during these six weeks. After her child was
born, she worked half a day and used maternity leave the other half for the first few
weeks. The Petitioner gradually progressed back to working half a day at home and half a
day at the office. By 1999 she was working 1 or 2 hours at home and the rest of the day
in the office.

11.

On May 21, 1997 (ME p. 163) symptoms were bilateral pain, and numbness in fingers,
hands, wrists, arms, shoulders, neck and head. By June 6,1997 (ME p. 166) symptoms
were improved markedly, but the Petitioner denies that the symptoms were completely
resolved, as noted, but does agree there was some relief. The June 18, 1997 notes show
continuing visits for pain. ME p. 168.

12.

In March 12, 1998 Petitioner visited Brent Bowen, M.D. who noted aching and burning
pain in the neck and upper thoracic areas and parascapular areas, and a sharp pain in the
right neck base paraspinal muscle. Also, frequent aching in the upper extremities
medially, into digits 3 and 4 of each hand were noted. The symptoms worsened with
prolonged positioning at the keyboard. ME p. 77. Dr. Bowen thought that work
restrictions were not necessary as long as the Petitioner continued to stand and limber
periodically. He recommended optimization of stress reduction methods at work. ME p.
81. Electrophysiological testing was performed on or about March 19, 1998 and
Petitioner was diagnosed with mild-moderate carpal tunnel syndrome bilaterally and
cervical myofascial pain. ME p. 89-92. Dr. Bowen eventually recommended physical
therapy. ME p. 103.

13.

Curtis Johnson M D. administered injections into the carpal tunnels in 1999 and again in
2001, which gave some relief, but he declined to give an impairment rating and has
recommended bilateral carpal tunnel releases, attributing the condition to Petitioner's
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work. ME p. 136. The Petitioner indicates that the injections helped reduce the swelling,
and therefore helped the pain and numbness. The effects lasted 3-4 months but the pain
level and symptoms would gradually return to former levels.
14.

The Petitioner also complained of ear pain, which she reported to the employer. She
asserts that the problem was eventually found to be causally related to the constant
telephone work and successfully treated by a Dr. Robbins. However, there is no medical
record before me which indicates a medical causal link between the Petitioner's ear pain
and the work she was doing at Epixtech.

15.

The Petitioner has not worked at Epixtech since July 7, 1999. She had been doing inside
sales work, but Epixtech had lost most of their outside salespersons, so for about a year
before she quit they had her doing all the sales in addition to inside duties. This required
onsite presentations, trade shows, and travel for 3-4 days at a time. She was
accommodated with a stand up workstation and a special keyboard, and moving about
kept her somewhat from tensing up, but didn't resolve the pain. The Petitioner quit the
job because she could not do the work anymore due to the pain in her hands, describing
the pain as a "10,f on a scale from 1-10.

16.

In 1994 the Petitioner was making $27,300 a year. Ex. R-2. This computes to a $525.00
average weekly wage.

17.

The Petitioner still visited Dr. Bowen for continuing symptoms. ME p. 112. A visit on
November 19, 2002 resulted in a note that pain was 8 out of 10. Dr. Bowen indicates her
condition was unchanged from prior visits. ME p. 114. He concurs with Dr. Johnson's
recommendation of bilateral carpal tunnel releases, indicates that the carpal tunnel
condition is causally related to Petitioner's employment, (ongoing myofascial pain in
upper extremities and scapular is not causally related), and gives a "6% whole person
impairment per arm" under the AMA 4th Ed. Guides. ME p. 115. He also indicates that
ongoing physical therapy would not be beneficial.

18.

Currently, the magnitude of symptoms depends of what the Petitioner does with her
hands in the morning and during the day. She does work for a company called
Ornamental Iron owned by her and her husband, since quitting Epixtech. The Petitioner
works in increments of time: she makes a few phone calls, looks over literature,
marketing, and follows up with accountants. She only does keyboarding for a couple of
minutes at a time. She checks e-mail, and does an invoice about once a week. She
works about 2 hours a day, spread throughout the day, and occasionally 5 hours a day.
She has had no other employment, and not received unemployment benefits. She is paid
about $1400/mo.

19.

Before Epixtech the Petitioner worked at Utah State Hospital for 8 years as an executive
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secretary. She spent about 60% of her time typing and also used the phone. She had no
carpal tunnel or upper extremity symptoms while she worked there. The Petitioner had
no injuries to her hands and wrists prior to working at Epixtech.
20.

The Petitioner hurt her low back lifting her daughter in 1998. She also had an automobile
accident July 2001 and was diagnosed with a cervical and lumbar strain, ME p. 73. In
September 2003 the Petitioner hurt her neck at a water park and sought treatment. The
Petitioner indicates that these conditions are not part of her industrial claim herein.

21.

Richard Knoebel, M.D. and Gerald Moress, M.D. performed an independent evaluation
on February 2, 2003. They disagreed with Drs. Bowen and Johnson that the carpal tunnel
syndrome was related to Petitioner's work, and therefore opine that no further treatment
paid for by the industrial carriers is warranted. They also assume that if EMG testing
were done, there would be no evidence to support an impairment rating. ME pp. 144-5.

22.

There is no evidence presented that the Petitioner lost any work days throughout her time
with Epixtech due to her industrial claims, and no medical evidence presented that
indicates the Petitioner was released from work due to same.

23.

There is no medical evidence that Petitioner's myofascial upper extremity/scapular
symptoms or her ear pain were caused by her employment duties. Therefore those claims
will be dismissed.

24.

I appointed Joseph Q. Jarvis, MD, MPH as chairman of the Commission medical panel in
this matter. He associated with Joel Dall, MD, a physiatrist, as panel member. The panel
reviewed the medical records and findings of fact and examined the petitioner. The panel
outlined that the primary risk factors for development of carpal tunnel syndrome are nonindustrial, so as a result, opined that the petitioner's work activities acted as a 10%
aggravation of the non-industrial risk factors. The panel opined that of the 10% causal
contribution, her work activities both before and after January 1, 1995 contributed. The
panel agreed that conservative treatment had failed and that her symptoms would likely
not improve without surgery. As a result, the panel did not believe the petitioner was
currently medically stable so permanent impairment was not addressed.

25.

The petitioner has proven by a preponderance of substantial evidence that surgery is
reasonably medically necessary to treat her bilateral carpal tunnel. Drs. Bowen, Johnson,
Jarvis and Dall agree that this is reasonably necessary to treat her condition. Because the
petitioner desires surgical treatment and the majority of medical opinion supports this
treatment recommendation, the petitioner is not currently medically stable so permanent
impairment cannot yet be addressed.

26.

The panel's opinion regarding causal contribution between industrial and non-industrial
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causes is supported by a preponderance of substantial evidence. Dr. Bowen's opinion,
given on November 19, 2002, is that".. .This carpal tunnel syndrome was diagnosed at a
time that she presented when she worked for Ameritech Systems and very well could
have been caused by the type of work she was doing there." On February 3, 2003, Drs.
Moress and Knoebel stated that because the petitioner's work was "self paced" she was
not at reasonable risk for development of carpal tunnel syndrome. The panel, chaired by
Dr. Jarvis, whose specialty is occupational medicine, addressed medical studies that have
been recently performed addressing the causes of carpal tunnel and noting that current
medical literature does not support keyboard work as a significant contributing cause to
carpal tunnel and gives an apportionment, required in occupational disease cases where
the activities are found in non-industrial life, unlike the other medical opinions. The
respondents are liable for 10% of the petitioner's medical care and compensation related
to her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Because the petitioner was injuriously exposed
throughout her work for the respondent, the last carrier, American Manufacturing/Kemper
is liable for 10% of the medical treatment and any compensation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Medical Causation
Utah Code Annotated § 35-2-107 (1991) reads:
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational disease is
defined as any disease or illness which arises out of and in the course of
employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment.

There is no medical evidence that Petitioner's myofascial upper extremity/scapular
symptoms or her ear pain were caused by her employment duties. Therefore those claims
will be dismissed.
The petitioner has proven by a preponderance of evidence that 10% of the cause of
her carpal tunnel symptoms is related to her work exposure throughout her period of
employment with the respondent.
2.

Last Injurious Exposure Rule
Utah Code Annotated § 35-2-105 (1991) indicates:
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an
occupational disease which arises out of and in the course of an
employee's employment for more than one employer, the only employer
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liable shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last
injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease if:
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of employment with
that employer was a substantial contributing medical cause of the
alleged occupational disease; and
(b) the employee was employed by that employer for at least 12
consecutive months.
(2)
Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be met, liability for
disability, death, and medical benefits shall be apportioned between
employers based on the involved employers' causal contribution to the
occupational disease.
The Commission has recently indicated in the Ballatore v. Buehner Block et al. decision,
Case No. 2002124 issued May 18, 2004, that the last injurious exposure rule should also be
applied to insurance carriers, and not just employers. In that case, there were two insurance
carriers covering the employer during the period of the Petitioner's exposure, and the issue was
which carrier had to pay benefits. The Commission held under the last injurious exposure rule
that the carrier insuring the employer during the last date of harmful exposure was liable for all
benefits.
In the present case, there is a possible exposure period with these Respondents from 1991
to the Petitioner's last day of employment in 1999. Continental insured Epixtech from January 1,
1989 through December 31,1994, and American Manufacturing Mutual/Kemper insured it from
January 1, 1995 through January 1, 2000. Therefore, American Manufacturing Mutual/Kemper
is liable for 10% of the petitioner's compensation and medical treatment.
3.

Other Medical Panel Issues
Utah Code Annotated § 35-2-106 (1991) provides:
(1) The benefits to which a disabled employee or the employee's
dependents are entitled under this chapter shall be based upon the employee's
average weekly wage at the time the cause of action arises and shall be computed
in accordance with and in all ways shall be equivalent to the benefits for disability
and death provided in Chapter 2.
(2) The disabled employee is entitled to medical, hospital, and burial
expenses equivalent to those provided in Chapter 2.
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(3) The procedure and payment of benefits under this chapter shall be
equivalent to and consistent with Chapter 2 .. ..
The petitioner has proven by a preponderance of substantial evidence that she is not
medically stable as the result of her carpal tunnel condition and that further treatment is
reasonably necessary so permanent impairment cannot yet be addressed and is reserved.
4.

180 Day Notice Issues

Relevant portions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-103 (1991) are as follows:
(2)
Any employee who fails to notify his employer or the commission
within 180 days after the cause of action arises is barred from any claim of
benefits arising from the occupational disease. The cause of action is considered
to arise on the date the employee first suffered disability from the occupational
disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,
that the occupational disease was caused by employment.
(3)
An employer's or physician's injury report filed with the
commission, employer, or insurance carrier, or the payment of any medical or
disability benefits by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier, constitutes
notification of an occupational disease.
I conclude that the cause of action arose in January 1994 when the Petitioner went to see
Dr. Theodore, who filed a first report of injury. There has been some argument that Petitioner's
occupational disease has come and gone and because the Petitioner failed to file new injury
reports with Epixtech each time symptoms resurged, she is precluded from benefits because she
did not notify the employer within 180 days. Particularly, the upper extremity myofascial
conditions were new in 1995. However, as discussed above, there is no medical evidence
presented that the myofascial conditions are causally related to the Petitioner's employment, and
therefore notice issues with regard to them are not relevant. Furthermore, with regard to the
overuse/carpal tunnel symptoms, it appears from the facts that the Petitioner's symptoms were
ongoing, and while they waned now and then, the Petitioner's symptoms have continued more or
less all along. The employer was aware of the problems because it accommodated her with a
special keyboard and standup station. Furthermore, Continental continued to pay medical
expenses up until the year 2000. Thus I conclude there are no failure to notice bars.
5.

Temporary Total Disability

Utah Code Annotated 35-1-65 (1981) provides:
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66 2/3% of
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that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as
such disability is t o t a l . . . .
There is no evidence that the Petitioner took time off work for her overuse/carpal tunnel
syndrome and there is no medical provider who has released her from working due to these
conditions. Therefore, the temporary total compensation claim will be dismissed.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondents, Ameritech Library Services fka Dynix aka
Epixtech and American Manufacturing Mutual/Kemper are liable for 10% of the petitioner's
compensation and medical care related to her bilateral carpal tunnel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the claims for medical expenses resulting from treatment for ear
pain and myofascial upper extremity/scapular conditions are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claim for temporary total compensation herein is dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers' Fund is dismissed as a party.
Issued this ^ ^ day of June, 2005.

Deidre Marlowe
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
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Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.
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Tamara Edmunds
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TAMARA M. EDMONDS,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
REVIEW

EPIXTECH,1 AMERICAN PROTECTION
SERVICES/KEMPERER and
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY,2

Case No. 02-0969

Respondents.

Tamara M. Edmonds requests review of Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's decision
regarding Ms. Edmonds claim for benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title
34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated).
The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for
review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12, § 34A-3-102(2) and § 34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On September 3, 2002, Ms. Edmonds filed an occupational disease claim against Epixtech
alleging that the repetitive stress of her employment had caused carpal tunnel syndrome.3 Judge
Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing and then referred the medical aspects of Ms. Edmonds' claim to
a medical panel. The panel submitted its report on September 9,2004. Ms. Edmonds and American
each filed objections to the report.
Judge Marlowe issued her decision on June 28, 2005. Because Ms. Edmonds had neither
missed work nor shown any permanent disability from her carpal tunnel syndrome, Judge Marlowe
did not award any disability compensation to Ms. Edmonds. Regarding Ms. Edmonds' claim for
1 Ms. Edmonds' employer has been known as "Ameritech Library Services," "Dynix," and
"Epixtech." In this decision, the Appeals Board refers to the company as Epixtech, its name during
the last period of Ms. Edmonds' employment.
2 During Mrs. Edmonds' employment, Epixtech was insured by two different insurance carriers:
Continental Casualty from January 1,1989, through December 31,1994; and American Protection
Services/Kemper from January 1,1995, through January 1,2000. Reference in the caption of Judge
Marlowe's decision to Continental Casualty/Kemper is incorrect and has been corrected. American
Protection Services/Kemper is referred to as "American" in this decision.
3 Ms. Edmonds' application also alleged other conditions affecting her neck, back and arms.
These claims were later abandoned by Ms. Edmonds.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
TAMARA M. EDMONDS
PAGE 2
medical benefits, Judge Marlowe's decision addressed American's objection to the panel report, but
did not address Ms. Edmonds' objection. Judge Marlowe then adopted the panel's conclusion that
90% of Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by non-work conditions and 10% was
attributable to work-related aggravation of those non-work conditions. Judge Marlowe ordered
American to pay 10% of Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses.4
Ms. Edmonds now requests review of Judge Marlowe's decision on the grounds that: 1) the
decision does not address Ms. Edmonds' objections to the medical panel report; and 2) the decision
improperly limits payment of Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The underlying facts of Ms. Edmonds work and the nature of her occupational illness are not
in dispute. Instead, Ms. Edmonds' motion for review raises primarily procedural and legal questions.
The Appeals Board therefore adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact.
DISCUSSION
Ms. Edmonds' objection to medical panel. Subsection 34A-2-601(l)(b) of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act authorizes ALJs to appoint medical panels to consider the medical
aspects of occupational disease claims. Subsection 601(2)(d)(ii) of the Act allows the parties to file
objections to medical panel reports. Ms. Edmonds filed such an objection to the panel report in this
case but Judge Marlowe did not address that objection. The Appeals Board will therefore consider
Ms. Edmonds' objection now.
Ms. Edmonds attacks the panel's attribution of 90% of her carpal tunnel syndrome to nonwork causes. The panel made this allocation based on its statement that carpal tunnel syndrome is
caused by certain non-work factors. Ms. Edmonds argues that, because she has none of the nonwork factors identified by the panel, it was illogical for the panel to conclude that 90% of her carpal
tunnel syndrome was caused by such non-work factors. The text of the medical panel's comment
regarding causes of carpal tunnel syndrome is as follows:
The primary risk factors leading to carpal tunnel syndrome in the general population
are non-industrial, and include age, anatomic factors, inherited tissue factors,
smoking status, endocrine problems, pregnancy, obesity, and inflammatory
conditions.
While it is true that not all of the foregoing factors apply to Ms. Edmonds, others do apply.
Specifically, anatomical and tissue factors that vary from individual to individual can cause carpal
4 American, rather than Continental, was ordered to pay Ms. Edmond's medical benefits because
American was the insurance carrier during the period of Ms. Edmonds' last exposure to carpal tunnel
syndrome at Epixtech. American has not contested its liability.
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tunnel syndrome. Furthermore, the panel's enumeration of risk factors was illustrative rather than
exhaustive. Considering the report as a whole, with due regard for the panel's impartiality, expertise,
and familiarity with Ms. Edmonds' entire medical history, the Appeals Board accepts the panel's
conclusions.
Apportionment of medical benefits. Judge Marlowe concluded that Ms. Edmonds's medical
benefit should be limited to 10% of the cost of treatment, based on medical panel's finding that Ms.
Edmonds' work accounted for 10% of the cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome. Judge Marlowe does
not explain the basis for her conclusion. The Appeals Board therefore turns to the statutory
provisions of the Occupational Disease Act.
Section 34A-3-103 of the Occupational Disease Act defines a "compensable occupational
disease" as "any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of employment and is medically
caused or aggravated by that employment."5 (Emphasis added.) The panel report establishes that
Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated by her work at Epixtech. Consequently, Ms.
Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome is a "compensable occupational disease." As such, it triggers
Epixtech's liability under § 34A-3-104(l) of the Act:
Every employer is liable for the payment of disability and medical benefits to
every employee who becomes disabled, or death benefits to the dependents of any
employee who dies by reason of an occupational disease under the terms of this
chapter.
Ms. Edmonds has not shown that her carpal tunnel syndrome caused any disability, but she
has required medical care. The precise question before the Appeals Board is whether Ms. Edmonds'
right to payment of her medical expenses is subject to, and reduced by, § 34A-3-110 of the Act.6

5 In Cook v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 57 P. 3d 1084, 1087 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court
observed that, for purposes of the Occupational Disease Act, the word "aggravate" does not signify
causation, but means "to make worse, more serious, or more severe."
6

Section 34A-3-110, "Occupational Disease Aggravated By Other Diseases" provides as follows:
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease,
or any part of the disease:
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to
commission jurisdiction;

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
TAMARA M. EDMONDS
PAGE 4
By its own terms, § 110 only applies to "compensation." Ms. Edmonds argues that this
precludes the use of § 110 to reduce medical benefits. However, American and Continental argue
that § 110's use of "compensation" should be interpreted as including disability compensation and
medical benefits, thereby making Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits subject to § 110's apportionment
formula.
In considering the meaning of "compensation" as used in § 110, the Appeals Board notes that
§ 102(2) of the Occupational Disease Act provides that "[s]ubject to the limitations provided in this
chapter, and unless otherwise noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act... are
incorporated into this chapter and shall be applied to occupational disease claims." Thus, in
considering the meaning of "compensation" for purposes of § 110 of the Occupational Disease Act,
the Appeals Board notes the definition provided by § 34A-2-102(3) of the Workers' Compensation
Act: "'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act."
The foregoing definition of "compensation" has been part of the Workers' Compensation Act
since at least 1943 and could be viewed as encompassing both disability compensation and medical
benefits. However, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979),
the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the term "compensation" did not include medical benefits.
Because § 110 was enacted after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kennecott, ibid., the
Appeals Board assumes that the Legislature intended the word "compensation" as used in § 110 to
have the meaning as was given in the Kennecott decision. The Appeals Board therefore concludes
that medical benefits do not fall within §110's use of the term "compensation" and are not subject to
§110's apportionment formula.
The foregoing conclusion is consistent with the well-established principle that the Act must
be liberally construed in favor of payment of benefits. The conclusion is also supported by the fact
that the degree of apportionment under §110 depends upon the application of the ratio of workrelated disability and non-work disability. In cases such as this, where there is no disability and only
medical benefits are due, § 110's apportionment formula would be impossible to apply.

(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed;
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational
disease.
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Summary. The Appeals Board has considered Ms. Edmonds' objection to the medical
panel's report, but for the reasons stated herein, accepts the medical panel's opinion. The Appeals
Board concludes that Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits are not subject to apportionment under § 34A3-110 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act.
ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board modifies the first paragraph of Judge Marlowe's
order, found at page 10 of her decision, as follows:
It is hereby ordered that respondents Epixtech and American Protection
Services /Kemper are liable for the reasonable expense of medical care necessary to
treat Tamara Edmonds' bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
The Appeals Board affirms the remaining portions of Judge Marlowe's decision. It is so
ordered.
Dated this gffi

day of August, 2006.

Colleen S. Colton, Chair

AA4A&-J

atricia S. Drawe

•.oju&fcr

Jofcdph E. Hatch

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review in the matter of Tamara
M. Edmonds, Case No. 02-0969, was mailed first class postage prepaid this Jtf day of August,
2006, to the following:
Tamara M. Edmonds
633 N 1000 E
MapletonUT 84664
Epixtech
400 W 5050 N
ProvoUT 84604
Uninsured Employers Fund
160E300S3rdFl
Salt Lake City UT 84114
Phillip Shell, Esq.
45 E Vine St
Murray UT 84107
Theodore Kanell, Esq.
136 E S Temple Ste 1700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Bret M. Hanna, Esq.
170 S Main St Ste 1500
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Thomas Sturdy, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

